The Consequences of Ceding North-East Syria to Iran, Assad and Russia





The Consequences of Ceding North-East Syria to Iran, Assad and Russia

23 March, 2017

At the moment of writing this report, the US military is transporting large quantities of military equipment to north Syria via Iraq and Turkey. Events in the north east of Damascus are not clear yet to predict any final results. But they remind all that a military solution equals the continuation of war for another decade. And the situation around Minbij is flaring up between the YPG and the Turkish backed Euphrates Shield, with Turkey doubling down in its support for the armed groups it backs.

Moreover, the front of north Aleppo may also reopen in the coming few days. But all signs, so far, indicate that two important steps have been taken in relation to north east Syria: 1- A decision, by the US military, to depend mainly on Syria Democratic Forces (SDF), which is made primarily of PKK affiliated YPG, to capture Raqqa 2- Before the end of this summer, the pages of Mosul and Raqqa would have been closed. The YPG is even talking about mid-April as the time of the attack on ISIL’s “capital”.

We will focus in this space on the situation in north east Syria.

Due to the strategic importance of that region to Iran’s Middle East plans, we see that Assad and Iran are trying to use the moment to shape the situation on the ground according to their agendas with total approval of the US, Russia and the PKK. Tehran is committed not to play any visible role in the battle of Raqqa as agreed in Iranian-Russian talks.

Yet, as we will show in a moment by Russian military statements, Iran will give way to SDF, which openly coordinates with Assad, and the Americans. Eventually, there is no question that the US decision will permit Iran, Assad and Russia to control the whole of north-east Syria in return for preventing the resurgence of ISIL and relieving the US from any long-term role in that region. The irony may be that allowing Iran and Assad to control that region is a recipe for having a new ISIL, just as we saw in Iraq when Al Zarqawi was defeated and central Iraq was given to Maliki and the Iranian.

It is difficult, as all who know the situation in Syria will tell you, to consider Assad and Iran two different sides in the war. Moreover, by counting only on the SDF-YPG, Russia and the US seem to have finally decided to write off all other players in the north east except Assad, Iran and Hezbollah.

Lieutenant General Sergei Rudskoy, Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Russian General Staff, has confirmed a deal between Russia, the Syrian government and the Kurds in Manbij (YPG-PKK) against Turkey and Turkish-backed rebels. “Since March 3, the Syrian Armed Forces enter the territory occupied by Kurdish militia groups [in reference to SDF] according to the agreements reached with the participation of the command of the Russian grouping of forces in Syria,” General Sergei Rudskoy said.

In other words, the Russians are openly saying that the they coordinate with Assad and the YPG, and that both coordinate with the US and Russia. Furthermore, the SDF-linked Manbij Military Council said March 16 that they have reached an agreement with Russia for the protection of villages west of Manbij from the Turkish army and Turkey-backed rebels, handing over villages in Western Manbij to the Syrian government.

“In order to realize these goals of ours, we as Manbij Military Council confirm that we have handed over the defense of the line – where villages between the positions of our forces in western Manbij and Turkish-affiliated gangs are located – to Syrian state forces as part of the alliance we have made with Russian officials,” the council said.

“The SDF ceded this territory west of Manbij because it is clear that there are limits to the extent that the United States will intervene on behalf of the SDF’s interests west of the Euphrates,” the statement added. Therefore, it is actually a combination of five forces: The YPG (PKK), the US, Russia, Assad and Iran (and its militias which constitute an integral part of Assad forces), which are now assigned to control that region of Syria.

Moreover, Russia is building a new military base in Afrin, just across the Turkish borders, to train the YPG. Turkey seems to have lost on all fronts. With no roads left to Erdogan, will he surrender totally to Moscow? Does anyone really believe that the Turks will play descent? Or is there a Russian-American arrangement to abort his game of playing on against the other? And how can anyone trust that Moscow will not end up with some permeant strategic breakthroughs and gains (Like a new base and control over a vast area of territories east of Syria and west of Iraq)?

In an interview with a news service later, Nicholas A. Heras, Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), said: “Ceding that territory west of Manbij to Assad’s forces, via a Russian-brokered deal, sends a signal to Turkey that the SDF understands the strategic value of the territory to Euphrates Shield, and will spite Turkey by giving it to Assad”. In other words, it is a calculated move by all relevant parties against the Turks and the Syrian opposition.

The many views that have been colliding within the Trump team on what the US should do have ended with drawing this plan of enabling the SDF to attack Raqqa. Preliminary views to exclude Assad and Iran were defeated in favor of expediency in the fight against ISIL. Critics of this idea must have raised the risks that come with it. But supporters of the plan won based on what we believe to be wrong evaluation. Moreover, Moscow defended the idea that Assad forces (including Iran’s IRGC, Hezbollah and Iraqi and Asian militias) are important operationally to secure that region after the defeat of ISIL.

But while Moscow tell the Manbij Council to allow Assad forces to advance east of the town, the US military is deploying combat forces in Tabqah to create a barrier between those forces and the Tabqah military airport, which the American commanders may be eyeing for future presence. Why then the Russians did not abide by their word to organize the moves of the forces in their side? Maybe they said, as they often did, that they cannot fully control Assad and Iran. But everyone can say the same as well. How is it possible to rely on a deal when its parties are not committed fully to it?

The mistakes of military commanders when they assume the responsibility of devising an overall strategy cannot be clearer. Expediency to “accomplish the mission” usually creates more problems than it solves. If all this is because of the desire to fulfill Trump’s commitment to defeat ISIL “within weeks”, the President should have been told that it will take a bit longer in order to prepare for the fight in a strategically coherent fashion. The issues in north east Syria requires talented strategists familiar will the extremely complicated factors underlying the conflict there, not a politician who cares about optics or a military commander who focuses single-mindedly on getting the job done today even if this will create a mess tomorrow. 

Experts in the academic world are divided on the impact of ceding north east Syria to the Russian, Iran and Assad. A respected expert, Joshua Landis, puts the dilemma as follows: If Turkey is permitted to attack Raqqa, we will end up with a Salafi State in the Euphrates Valley. This will lead to an Al Qaeda state there. Moreover, talking about locals to liberate their region, as the Turks do, is misleading, because Turkey will marshal different Arabs from other areas. The fact that they are all Arab Sunnis may disguise that part of them are Al Qaeda.

Then, according to Dr. Landis, “If the United States helps or allows Turkey to attack the Kurds at Tel Abyad, it will have no Kurdish allies to attack Raqqa or any other part of ISIS territory…The Turks are pitching their interest in liberating ISIS territory as a “local-Arabs-must-rule” campaign, but the Arabs whom it will be marshaling for its force are largely from Idlib and Aleppo provinces. These are agricultural regions quite different from the desert and tribal Euphrates. The accent and customs of both are different. It is not certain that Raqqans will embrace these new rulers as being among “their own” or as an exercise in self-rule. Of course, they are all Sunni Arabs. In all likelihood, they will risk being dominated by anti-American Salafist elements that will assert themselves and reintegrate al-Qaida members and possibly ISIS defectors back into their state”.

Then, his advice is: “Russia and Iran want to divide ISIS territory between the Kurds and the Syrian government that is led by Assad. “The United States should allow this to happen if it wants an exit strategy. But though this advice will not bring democracy or human rights, it allows the US to have an exit strategy anyway”.

Then, he goes on, the Kurds have to be convinced to restrain their ambitions in order to get the Turks to let all this happen.

There are many flaws in this narrative.

Dr Landis says that “It is not certain that Raqqans will embrace these new rulers (Those coming from Aleppo country side and Idlib)” Here, we see an assumption that many bonds like being a Sunni, plus a Syrian, plus an Arab are not enough to put the Arabs of Aleppo and those of the north-east, Raqqa and Dair Al Zour, together in harmony. Why can’t they be together? Due to customs, dialect and economic activities, Dr. Landis claims. But what are the bonds between the Kurds, the Iranians, the Russians or Assad in one hand and those locals of the north east of Syria on the other? Are they stronger? (And by the way, “local-Arabs-must-rule” and depending on the local inhabitants to pacify a region is not said by the Turks as Dr. Landis claim. It is said by none other than General David Petraeus).

But there are many other flaws in Landis argument. There is, for example, the assumption that the Turks are intrinsically betrayers of any deal they reach with the US. However, in his views, the Kurds could be “convinced” to “limit their aspirations” and to commit to abandoning their national dream. But there is a track record with the PKK that testifies to the fact that we are talking here about an ideological group whose raison d’etre is preserving those very aspirations that Landis will convince them to limit. What the writer demands is that the PKK revokes its very identity and abandons its own raison of existence as a political organization.

All the argument of this expert boils down to two points: The importance of having an exit strategy for the US and the need of methods to prevent the rise of a Jihadi state in the north-east of Syria. The first objective should not be considered seriously, however. The US did not have any serious entry strategy to think of an exist one yet. Moreover, if the idea is to leave the whole area to Russia, Iran and Assad, why have an entry, or exit, strategies in the first place? It is just an example of how the threat of using force retaliates those who may use force, not their enemies. In other words, using the threat of war by the US military to retaliate adversaries has turned into a retaliation to the US military not the adversaries.

Then, we are left with the serious prospects raised by the writer in his credible assumption that a Jihadi state may rise in the Raqqa region. Whereas this is indeed a serious assumption, the ways proposed by the writer to avoid it do not constitute a valid argument or a workable strategy.

In fact, giving that area to Assad, Iran and the Russians will lead to a certain recurrence of ISIL. Al Qaeda was defeated in Central Iraq and that region was given to Maliki and his allies. The writer does not seem to appreciate the fact that north-east Syria’s inhabitants are mostly Sunnis, and that they are conscious of their religious identity due to the war, and due to the suffering of their “extensions” in the Iraqi desert, on the hands of Maliki and the Iranian militias. He does not also seem to appreciate the depth of hatred to Assad and his allies after the slaughter of 500,000 Syrians. These two underestimations will prove very costly in the future. There is no question in our minds about this.

The US would have gone out of that region. True. It would have delegated that region to Russia-Syria and Iran as Dr. Landis recommends. But at one point in the future, it will find it unavoidable to go back, same as what happened in Iraq. For the whole approach neglects the Turks, the Arabs, the Syrian tribes, and the Syrian people.

Again, the “golden rule” in defeating any insurgency is to mobilize the local population behind you. Here, the Arabs, the Turks and even the Russians and the Jordanians can help create the social base of an anti-ISIL, long-term, Sahawas. This should strictly be filtered and sponsored by the US in order to detect, early on, any suspicious activities. Those Sahawas should be based on two social bases: The Kurd and the Arab inhabitants of that region. Tribal councils can work on creating the necessary cooperation between both groups, which have been living together for centuries anyway.

The tribal bonds in that region extend to Iraq, the Arab Peninsula and Jordan. Just take a look at the names of the tribes of the north-east of Syria. Any patient plan to create Syrian Sahwas has a good chance of working. Many segments of the really moderate Syrian defected former officers could also be re-vetted to include in the proposed force. The US military has a wealth of lessons to learn from since the Anbar war. It will take time. But what comes easy goes easy as they say. Expediency has a price. 

Those Sahawas will not be part of any “opposition” to Assad. They will not represent an “independent” entity. They will not be pro anyone or anti any other. They will have nothing to do with national aspirations or the Salafi Sharia. They will just fight ISIL and live in peace protected by their own sons and by assurances and assistance from all major players, all the while knowing that the appearance of a Jihadist group in their region will entail a price that they have to pay: They will lose peace and the future of their children, for the second time in one single generation.

It may be too late now to raise all these remarks. But better put them on writing now as we are almost certain that we will revisit this issue at one point in the future.  

 


 














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