Saudi Arabia and the ASEAN Periphery: Cambodia, Myanmar, and Brunei

Mohammed Al-Sudairi

Saudi Arabia's ties with ASEAN's smaller actors - Cambodia, Myanmar, and Brunei1 - whose diplomatic relations with the Kingdom have only been established over the last two decades, are subject to a number of challenges. These challenges differ depending on the country in question (population, geography, economic disparities, size of local Muslim communities and so on) and have impeded the emergence of closer and economically robust ties so far. Notwithstanding this, surveying the current state of relations between Saudi Arabia and these countries is necessary so as to understand the general topography of the Kingdom's engagement with the whole of ASEAN as well as to better appreciate the trajectory of relations and potential synergies that may emerge in the future.

1. Saudi-Cambodia Relations

Saudi Arabia and Cambodia established formal diplomatic ties in 2010, with the Saudi Ambassador in Vietnam assuming the role of non-resident diplomat to Phnom Penh.2 This move was principally galvanized by Saudi Arabia's growing disputes with a number of countries - including the Philippines, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia - over workers' rights and wage standards.3 Indeed, since 2010, the two countries have held sustained official talks over the entry of Cambodian manpower (as domestic servants, workers etc.) into the Saudi market as well as the means by which both parties could address the the vocational and logistical issues associated with such a move.4 In addition to this potential synergy over labor, it is probable that the consolidation of Saudi-Cambodian ties was also driven to some extent by deepening business (particularly with regard to food security) and tourism ties, and perhaps more significantly, by a desire on the part of Riyadh for a more expanded engagement with the ASEAN bloc (given Phnom Penh's considerable political clout within the organization).

The establishment of diplomatic ties served in many ways to consecrate Saudi Arabia's already long-term but low-key presence in Cambodia, which largely played out through its extensive links with the country's Cham Muslims, who number nearly 240,000 and make up about 1.6-2 percent of the country's population.5 Since the 1990s, Saudi as well as Gulf (mainly Kuwaiti) organizations have an active presence in the country, funding the construction of numerous mosques and religious schools and cooperating extensively with local Muslim groups.6 The Saudi authorities, in addition to extending humanitarian aid to this community, have occasionally sponsored - mostly during King Fahd's reign - Cham pilgrims and students coming to the Kingdom.7 The Cambodian government has generally welcomed the presence of Saudi-affiliated organizations within the country, including the Islamic Development Bank which backed a number of projects in 2006 and 2007.8 This welcoming attitude might stem from the crystallization of a Cambodian "Islamic diplomacy" aimed at attracting Malaysian, Indonesian, and Gulf development aid and investments into the country. Perhaps towards that end, Cambodia has encouraged the participation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in several conferences organized by Cham Muslims.9 It should be noted, however, that the presence of Saudi organizations has produced some fears regarding the potential spread of Wahhabi fundamentalism within the indigenous Cham Muslim communities, and more worryingly, has raised the specter of potential terror threats.10 In 2003, for example, several teachers from a Saudi-funded Islamic school were arrested due to their affiliation with the Jemaah Islamiah, a Southeast Asian group associated with Al-Qaeda, leading to the closure of the said school.11 Nonetheless, it does not appear that these fears have significantly affected the nascent Saudi-Cambodian relationship so far.

2. Saudi-Myanmar Relations

Saudi Arabia and Myanmar agreed to establish formal diplomatic ties at the ambassadorial level in 2004.12 This was followed by Saudi Arabia opening an embassy in Yangon in 2005 (complemented by a goodwill gesture extending considerable humanitarian aid in 2006), and Myanmar inaugurating its own embassy in Riyadh in 2007.13 Albeit delayed, this recognition was probably prompted by growing Gulf interest in Myanmar in the early 2000s as a lucrative emerging market of 50 million people in proximity to both India and China, with significant expanses of arable land (Myanmar, it is worth noting, is a major exporter of rice - a commodity of importance to the food security goals of the Gulf) as well as sizeable deposits of mineral resources and natural gas.14 Notwithstanding the attractiveness of the country as an investment destination, it appears that Saudi "economic" interest in Myanmar is so far largely intertwined with its China-focused "Eastward policy." In 2011, Saudi Aramco and the China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) signed a memorandum to construct a joint-venture 10 million-ton annual capacity refinery in China's southwest land-locked province of Yunnan.15 Access to Saudi crude for the refinery would be acquired through a major pipeline network that would be constructed through Myanmar by CNPC. Such a project circumvents the Malacca Strait - alleviating, to some extent, Chinese strategic fears - while cutting delivery costs to the Chinese market, a profitable outcome for Aramco.16

Beyond the economic arena, growing interest in Myanmar on the part of the Saudi authorities may have also been galvanized at the time by a desire to address the question of the Rohingya Muslim refugees in Saudi Arabia. Offered asylum during the reign of King Faisal following their repeated expulsion by the Myanmar authorities (which has refused to recognize them as citizens of the state since 1982 but rather considers them denizens of neighbouring Bangladesh), the Rohingya (or Birmawiyya as they are called colloquially in Saudi) arrived in the country in waves starting from the 1970s.17 Concentrated mostly in Makkah, Jeddah, and Medina, the Rohingya today number somewhere between 250,000 (official estimate) and 600,000 (unofficial estimate) and are dispersed across the Kingdom.18 Suffering from institutional disregard and discrimination, as well occupying a nebulous legal limbo, many Rohingya in Saudi are relegated to social and economic destitution.19 While the authorities have recently sought to alleviate some of the problems facing the Rohingya and have explored the option of repatriating them to third countries like Pakistan or Bangladesh, returning them eventually to Myanmar - following a conclusive resolution of their final status - has been probably deemed to be the best solution (a calculation that may have underpinned the establishment of diplomatic ties back in 2004.) However, the eruption of a new round of violence since 2012 targeting mostly the Rohingya has strained relations with Myanmar considerably and has, for the most part, led to the shelving of this option for the moment. Saudi Arabia has accused Myanmar of committing ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya and has urged greater international sanctions against the country through the OIC and UN bodies.20 It has also sent some $50 million in humanitarian assistance in 2012.21 It should be noted that while the Rohingya issue has negatively influenced Saudi-Myanmar relations, it does not appear to have obstructed the Saudi-Chinese refinery project in Yunnan.22

3. Saudi-Brunei Relations

Saudi Arabia and Brunei Darussalam established formal diplomatic relations in 1992, with an initial non-resident Saudi representation in Manila, Philippines that was soon followed, in 1995, with the opening of a Saudi embassy in Bandar Seri Begawan (although the appointment of an ambassador would have to wait until 2001).23 The two countries held talks over an agreement aimed at strengthening various areas of economic engagement, including investments, tourism, oil and petrochemicals (Brunei is a major oil-producing country), industry, healthcare, and education, which was finally ratified by both sides in 2007.24 Unsurprisingly, and given Brunei's small (400,000) but largely Muslim population (some 75 percent), the area that has seen the most sustained interaction between the two states is the religious sphere. Since 2002, the Saudi authorities have allotted Brunei an annual quota of 400 Haj pilgrims, although in recent years the authorities in Brunei have pressed for a larger quota.25 Throughout the year, these pilgrims are joined by sizeable numbers - estimated at around 5,000 - of visitors from Brunei to the Kingdom coming for the Umrah (the smaller pilgrimage,) business, tourism, conferences and so forth.26 Unfortunately, there is little by way of data regarding the number of Saudi visitors to Brunei, although it is worth noting that the country is promoting itself as a destination for "Islamic tourism" that may help place it on the radar of Saudi tourists coming to Southeast Asia.27 More recently, due to domestic shifts within Brunei, there has been greater cooperation with regard to Shariah application and enforcement.28

(Mohammed Al-Sudairi is a Researcher with the Gulf Research Center)